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Abstract
In the debate on the beneﬁts of international ﬁnancial integration,
recent literature has emphasized the development of domestic mar-
kets as a precondition. This paper oﬀers an alternative view. Lack of
competition in domestic ﬁnancial systems may prevent countries from
reaping the beneﬁts of international integration simply because it pre-
vents them from being integrated in a meaningful way - that of price
equalization. A new index of de-facto ﬁnancial integration is used to
explore this question and conﬁrms a strong link. The level of de-jure
controls, volatility and institutions matter for price integration but
their importance diﬀers between developed and developing countries.
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1Bank Competition and International Financial Integration:
Evidence using a new index
‘The market for a given set of ﬁnancial instruments and/or ser-
vices is fully integrated if all potential market participants with the
same relevant characteristics (1) face a single set of rules when they
decide to deal with those ﬁnancial instruments and/or services; (2)
have equal access to the above-mentioned set of ﬁnancial instruments
and/or services; and (3) are treated equally when they are active in
the market.’
– Beale et. al (2004)
When markets are ﬁnancially integrated in the sense deﬁned above, the law of
one price holds, i.e., all potential agents in both markets1 will face identical
prices for identical assets. This price equalization has important implications
for the economy’s growth, consumption and output volatility, exposure to crisis
and for monetary policy independence through the trilemma2.
This paper is an attempt to understand the extent to which price integration
has progressed in developed and developing economies in the recent decade(s)
and the various forces that have helped or hindered this convergence. Price con-
vergence is measured by the index introduced in Pasricha (2008) that captures
the size of deviations from covered interest parity as well as the speed of rever-
sion to the no-arbitrage band. In this paper, I construct this index on a yearly
basis for 54 countries for an average of 13 years per country3, comparing inter-
est rates on interbank loans across countries. Previous attempts at measuring
price convergence in ﬁnancial markets have focused on either average absolute
deviations (Chinn-Ito, 2007) which do not capture the speed of arbitrage, or the
beta-convergence measure (Baele et. al, 2004) which captures integration be-
tween a group of countries but does not allow one to rank diﬀerent countries on
1with the same relevant characteristics
2see Kose et al. [2009] for an excellent survey
3The list of countries and the years for which data is available are listed in Table 1
1their degree of convergence. The index developed here is the ﬁrst time-varying
index that allows one to rank countries and takes into account both the size of
their no-arbitrage bands4 and the speed with which the arbitrage occurs, once
it is proﬁtable.
Using this measure of price convergence, I explore the factors that contribute
to this convergence, or the lack of it. My main focus is on the link between the
degree of integration and the competitiveness of the domestic ﬁnancial sector.
While there is a large literature on the implications of domestic banking sector
competitiveness for growth (Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Cetorelli, 2001), access
to ﬁnance (Beck et. al, 2004) and stability (Boyd et. al., 2007; Boyd and Nicola,
2005; Allen and Gale, 2004; Hartmann and Carletti, 2002), the link between the
former and the degree of international integration has not been dwelt into. Such
a link is important because its existence implies that countries with partially
open capital accounts would see greater price convergence with international
markets if they liberalized their domestic banking sector, even without opening
it to foreign players. They may also try to put sand in the wheels of international
capital without appearing to do so, through tightening domestic regulation.
There are several reasons why one would expect a link between domestic
ﬁnancial market structure and international price convergence5. Freixas and
Holthausen (2005) show that even in the absence of capital controls, when there
is asymmetric information between domestic market and foreign market, a seg-
mented market equilibrium may occur, with no interbank activity across the
borders. When an integrated equilibrium does occur, the interbank market in-
tegration will not be perfect (the interbank rates will not be equalized), even in
the presence of correspondent banking. In their model, the signal that banks
4The no-arbitrage band captures the minimum deviation required for arbitrage to be prof-
itable and increases with the size of transactions costs and capital controls
5In the absence of capital controls and any kind of friction like asymmetric information
that prevents all domestic participants from accessing foreign market and vice versa, price-
convergence will occur, irrespective of the structure of domestic ﬁnancial markets. It is only
when either capital controls or some other frictions are present (as in the real world) that the
structure of domestic ﬁnancial market becomes relevant.
2get about foreign banks’ type is more noisy than the signal about domestic
banks, leading to an interest diﬀerential at which a bank may borrow domes-
tically and the interest rate at which it may borrow abroad (or from a corre-
spondent bank that borrows abroad to lend domestically). Adding imperfect
competition in domestic banking sector to their model will only exacerbate the
domestic-foreign interest diﬀerentials and may increase the range of possibili-
ties where a segmented equilibrium is the only possibility. Secondly, market
power in the interbank market would lead to greater bid-ask spreads directly
(Khemraj and Pasha, 2008; Pasricha, 2008b) and through its impact on market
liquidity. Carletti, Hartmann and Spagnolo (2007) show that bank consolida-
tion may lead to greater variance in aggregate liquidity demand and Acharya,
Gromb and Yorulmazer (2008) that surplus banks may under provide liquidity
when outside options of needy banks are weak. Several empirical studies in the
foreign exchange market have shown that thinner markets or those with greater
volatility have higher bid-ask spreads (Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Bollerslev and
Melvin, 1994).
The results indeed conﬁrm a strong link between lack of ﬁnancial sector
competitiveness (banking and non-banking) and lack of price convergence, par-
ticularly for low and middle income countries. Capital controls explain only a
small part of deviations from covered interest parity. Crisis periods and periods
of greater volatility see lower de-facto integration.
In the next section, I describe the construction of the index and in section 3,
I discuss the trends in ﬁnancial integration over the sample period. In section 4,
I empirically examine the link between domestic ﬁnancial competitiveness and
ﬁnancial integration. Section 5 concludes.
31 Measuring Price Convergence
1.1 Covered Interest Deviations in the Presence of Fric-
tions
In a fully integrated world with perfectly competitive proﬁt maximizing agents
and no transactions costs or other frictions, the following Covered Interest Par-
ity (CIP) condition would hold in equilibrium:
δt = P
 Ft+k − St
St
 
− (it+k − i∗
t+k) = 0 (1)
where δt is the covered interest diﬀerential, it+k and i∗
t+k are respectively returns
on comparable domestic and foreign assets between time t and t+k, expressed
as per cent per annum. St is the domestic currency price of foreign currency,
Ft+k is the forward rate or the kth period domestic currency price of foreign
exchange delivered in that period. P is a scaling factor, used to annualized and
convert into percentage terms, the ﬁrst term6. Since all the variables in the
above equation are known a priori, any deviation from this parity in our model
world represents pure proﬁts and therefore cannot exist in equilibrium.
However, as discussed in Frenkel and Levich (1975) and in Pasricha(2008a),
in a world with transactions costs, exchange or capital controls or risk of such
controls, diﬀerential taxation, the measured covered diﬀerential would lie in a
no-arbitrage band, even with eﬃcient and risk neutral markets. This happens
because the econometrician’s measure of covered diﬀerential, which is based on
the average of the forward and spot rates (rather than the bid-ask rates) and
the average of the interest rates does not capture the actual proﬁts, net of taxes
and other costs of arbitrage. One should then expect the measured diﬀerential,
ˆ δ to satisfy:
κn ≤ ˆ δ ≤ κp (2)








and the precise forms of κn and κp depend on the transactions costs and capital
controls (as well as the levels of exchange and interest rates)7. The measured
deviations within the no-arbitrage bands are therefore, consistent with equilib-
rium and with covered interest parity, and may be unit root processes. Further,
when the supply of arbitrage capital is less than perfectly elastic, due either to
quantitative controls, asymmetric information, or imperfect competition in mar-
kets, then proﬁtable deviations may not be immediately arbitraged away but
in rational markets, would eventually be arbitraged away (Cheng and Cheung,
2008; Fong, Valente and Fun, 2008).
1.2 Empirical Model for Covered Interest Deviations
These considerations lead one to the choice of an Asymmetric, Self-Exciting
Threshold Autoregressive Model (ASETAR) model as the empirical model to
estimate the boundaries of the no-arbitrage band (called the thresholds) and
the speed of reversion outside the band. This model is called ‘self-exciting’
because the thresholds are lags of δ itself, and asymmetric because the negative
threshold is allowed to diﬀer from the positive threshold. It takes the form:
δt = ρiδt−1 + ǫt for κn < δt−1 < κp (3)
δt − κn = ρn(δt−1 − κn) + ǫt for δt−1 ≤ κn (4)
δt − κp = ρp(δt−1 − κp) + ǫt for δt−1 ≥ κp (5)
where ǫt ∼ N(0,σ2) and κn and κp are the negative and positive thresholds
respectively. In theory, the deviations inside the band are unit-root processes,
so the model is estimated with ρi = 1. Note that this model implies that
speculative activity will push the deviations to the edges of the band, rather than
its center. The hypothesis of eﬃcient arbitrage states that the AR(1) process
outside the bands be stationary. If the thresholds were known, the model could
7These are described in Pasricha(2008a)
5be estimated by ordinary least squares applied separately to the inner regime
and outer regime observations. Since the thresholds are not known, they may
be estimated either by a grid search, or by a sequential method suggested in
Hansen(1999) that also yields conﬁdence intervals for the thresholds. In this
method, a grid search is ﬁrst made for a single threshold, yielding a minimum
residual sum of squares, say S1( ˜ κ1), where the function S everywhere denotes
the residual sum of squares function. In a two regime model, the ﬁrst search
would yield the stronger of the two threshold eﬀects. Fixing the ﬁrst-stage





S( ˜ κ1,κ2) if ˜ κ1 < 0
S(κ2, ˆ κ1) if ˜ κ1 > 0
(6)
and the second-stage threshold estimate is the one that minimizes the above
function, i.e.:
ˆ κ2 = argmin S2(κ2) (7)






S( ˆ κ2,κ1) if ˆ κ2 < 0
S(κ1, ˆ κ2) if ˆ κ2 > 0
(8)
and the reﬁnement estimator for the ﬁrst threshold is:
ˆ κ1 = argmin Sr
1(κ1) (9)
As a practical matter, the search is conducted over all unique values of the
actual observations between the 5th and the 95th percentiles and is restricted
so that at least 5% of observations fall in each of the three regimes. When
the model is estimated for every year using daily observations, this restricts the
minimum number of observations in each regime to be between 10 and 12.













6The asymptotic (1−α)% conﬁdence intervals for κ1 and κ2 are the set of values
of each such that Lr
1(κ1) ≤ c(α) and Lr
2(κ2) ≤ c(α). Hansen(1999) also shows
that





To construct the Integration Index, Pasricha (2008a) takes into account ﬁve dif-
ferent measures that derive from the model. The ﬁrst is the bandwidth, which
measures the size of the no-arbitrage band, and is expected to be wider the
greater the transactions costs or the eﬀective controls in an economy. The last
three measures are the percentage of observations lying in the outer regimes8(OutObs),
the median positive and negative deviation outside the measured band (MedDevNeg
and MedDevPos respectively) and the third quartile of continuous runs outside
the band (3rdQuartile). These measures capture how frequent are proﬁtable
deviations from interest parity, and how fast they revert back to the band. The
more elastic the supply of capital and the less eﬀective the controls, the faster
the reversion speed9. One could also use the AR coeﬃcients in outer regimes
or the half lives, but the results should be similar. Medians and quartiles are
preferable to average deviations as they are immune to outliers.
Each of the indicators mentioned above are ﬁrst normalized by subtracting
from them their inter-country mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
This makes the resulting index centered at zero. The normalizations are done
separately for the two maturities, one and three months. For countries for which
data on one of the maturities is not available, the available maturity’s data is
used to approximate for the missing maturity model. The Integration Index for
8Using percentage of observations rather than number of observations takes care of the
concern about uneven sample sizes inﬂuencing the latter.
9Note that the paper uses daily data, and thus measured deviations are those that were
present at the end of the day.














etc., and Xk and σk are, respectively the mean and standard deviation (over all
country-time observations of maturity k) of X for X = Bandwidth, OutObs,
MedDevN, MedDevP, 3rdQrt. The equation (10) normalizes each of the vari-
ables (Bandwidth, OutObs etc) so that the resulting normalized variables are
pure numbers and can be averaged.
Since there are no theoretical priors that allow one to assign diﬀerent weights
on the diﬀerent components of the index based on their contribution to ’open-
ness’, this index uses a simple average. Besides being transparent, such an
average is based on the premise that greater openness means both, smaller de-
viations from parity and deviations that are arbitraged away more quickly. The
negative sign in (10) allows larger values of the index to be interpreted as greater
integration.
1.4 Data and Results
To construct the index, interest rates on interbank loans of 1 and 3 month matu-
rities were used except for Brazil, where these were unavailable, so the Certiﬁcate
of Deposit rates were used. The data on interbank rates are from Bloomberg
and Thomson Financial’s Datastream databases for all countries except South
Africa and Columbia, whose rates were sourced from Global Financial Database,
as these were unavailable in Bloomberg or Datastream. The exchange rate data
is all from Bloomberg and Datastream. The forward exchange rates are onshore
forward rates of 1 and 3 month maturities, except for Chile where onshore for-
ward data was unavailable so non-deliverable forwards were used. For countries
8that had adopted the Euro, the exchange rates pertain to the Euro after Jan 1,
1999 or their date of accession, whichever is later. Table 1 summarizes the index
for the whole sample and for high income and low and middle income country
groupings respectively (World Bank Classiﬁcation). High income countries have
on average, greater openness than low and middle income countries (mean 0.6
compared to average openness of -0.18 for the low and middle income group).
The high income countries also see lower variability in their openness. Figure
1 plots the index over time for these country groups. The ﬁgure highlights the
fact that the level of price convergence is not a slow moving variable. It ﬂuc-
tuates from year to year, even for high income countries, much more than say
the degree of legal restrictions. However, it is important to keep in mind that
the ﬁgure is not on a balanced panel. New countries are added to each of the
income groups as their data becomes available and this may contribute to some
of the ﬂuctuations, especially since the total number of countries in the sample
is not too large. The large dip in openness around the year 1998 in the low
and middle income countries is due to the Asian crisis which saw the imposition
of capital controls in these countries, most eﬀectively in Malaysia. The dip in
2001 is due to Turkey’s ﬁnancial crisis. Figure 3 shows the low and middle
income countries’ average openness excluding Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey.
Noteworthy is the large dip in openness in the current crisis. While the high
income countries show a positive trend in openness, the same is not true for low
and middle income countries.
2 Determinants of Price Convergence
This section identiﬁes determinants of de-facto openness as measured by price
convergence. The emphasis is on the relationship between price convergence
and de-jure capital controls and competitiveness of domestic banking sector. I
use the following model:
Indexit = α + βXit + γt + ǫit (11)
9where Indexit is the integration index constructed above for country i, time t,
Xit are a set of country characteristics, detailed below and t is a time trend. The
regressions are estimated using a Prais Winston procedure allowing for panel
speciﬁc AR(1) correction, as the residuals from the OLS ﬁxed eﬀects regressions
showed autocorrelation.
Explanatory variables include measures of banking competitiveness, mea-
sures of legal restrictions to cross-border capital ﬂows, macroeconomic variables
and measures of transactions costs and liquidity in the interbank and foreign
exchange markets.
I use four diﬀerent proxies for domestic banking sector competitiveness -
the net interest margins which equal the accounting value of banks’ net interest
revenue as a share of their total assets, bank overhead costs to total assets ra-
tio, return on equity for the banking sector and bank concentration ratio which
is the ratio of total assets of the banking sector that are owned by the three
largest banks. Each of these variables is from the world bank’s ﬁnancial struc-
ture database10. A higher level of each of the variables denotes greater monopoly
power in domestic banking and therefore should be associated with lower inter-
national integration. Neither of these is a perfect measure of competitiveness,
however each of these has been used as proxy for the bank competitiveness in
the literature and some are better than the others. Banks with market power
can charge higher rates of loans and pay lower rates on deposits (Berger and
Hannan, 1989; Hannan 1991). Demirguc, Laeven and Levine (2003) ﬁnd that
regulatory restrictions on banking activity, including freedom of entry and lack
of institutional development substantively increase net interest margins. They
also ﬁnd that the net interest margins increase with state control of the banking
sector, and decline with development of the stock markets, which would com-
pete with banks as a source of funding. Higher proﬁts of a less competitive
industry may be reﬂected in higher return on equity (ROE) or higher overhead
costs (Berger and Hannan, 1998; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998; Martinez Peria
and Mody, 2004). Bank concentration ratio in theory should be higher for less
10For more details on the variables and sources, see appendix table.
10competitive systems but in practice, the evidence is weak. It does not take into
account the fact that banks may compete with non-bank ﬁnancial institutions
and with other ﬁnancial markets or that threat of entry matters for eﬀective
competition (Panzar and Rosse, 1987, Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Beck et. al,
2006).
In order to account for the competition banks may face from non-bank ﬁnan-
cial sectors, I use a measure of ﬁnancial development which is the ﬁrst principal
component of life insurance premiums ratio to GDP, stock market capitalization
ratio to GDP, stock market total value as ratio to GDP and domestic credit to
private sector as percentage of GDP. The ﬁrst three are from World Bank’s ﬁ-
nancial structure database and the last from World Bank’s World Development
Indicators database.
While the level of capital controls determine the de-facto ﬁnancial integra-
tion, market players often ﬁnd ways to evade the controls, so the relation need
not be one-to-one. Moreover, even in the absence of capital controls, other im-
perfections - transactions and information costs, asymmetric information, im-
perfect competition etc - impinge on the price convergence with international
markets, so that even in the absence of capital controls, price convergence may
not be perfect. The coeﬃcient on de-jure measure of openness is therefore ex-
pected to be positive but less than one. I use the Chinn-Ito measure of capital
account openness (KA Open), which takes higher values for fewer legal restric-
tions on capital ﬂows across borders.
Bank competitiveness, capital controls as well as risk of future controls may
be positively related to the degree of development of institutions in the coun-
try (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Ito and Chinn, 2007). On the other hand,
for any given level of capital controls, evasion would be more the worse the
institutions. I include a measure of institutional development, which is the ﬁrst
principal component of corruption and political risk indices from PR Group’s
International Country Risk Guide. Higher levels of these variables reﬂect lower
corruption or risk. The sign of the institutional variable may be positive or
negative.
11As a proxy for transactions costs in currency markets, I compute the per-
centage bid-ask spread (as a percentage of mean rate) in the spot exchange rate
markets using daily data. An average of these for the year for each currency is
included as an explanatory variable (X Spread). One would expect higher aver-
age spreads to be associated with lower openness. Similar spreads on interbank
interest rates were not available for most of the countries in the sample.
I compute the coeﬃcient of variations in the interbank and average for the
1- and 3- month forward exchange rate markets, as volatility in the markets
may be used to proxy for the lack of liquidity in the markets, as well as for the
risk premia.
Crisis periods often see either new capital controls imposed or renewed en-
forcement of existing regulations. Banking crisis periods, additionally are also
periods of heightened counterparty risks and lower liquidity in interbank mar-
kets, and serve here to control for these risk premia. Both kinds of crisis periods
are therefore expected to be associated with lower price convergence. I include
two dummy variables for crisis periods in the regressions, one for banking crisis
and another for currency crisis. Currency Crisis dummy uses the Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) index of currency market turbulence (a weighted average of ex-
change rate and reserve changes) to identify crisis months and takes the value 1
for years in which there was one or more crisis month. The Bank Crisis dummy
variable takes the value 1 for years in which there was a systemic banking crisis
and is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008).
Finally, a trend variable is included to test if the world has indeed become
more globalized over time, GDP per capita in thousands of 2000 US dollars to
test if higher income countries are more integrated after controlling for their
level of ﬁnancial development, institutions etc, and the ratio of trade to GDP.
Greater trade integration should make it easier to evade capital controls as
over invoicing of imports and under invoicing of exports are popular ways of
exporting capital in countries with controls (Aizenman 2008; Aizenman and
Noy, 2009; Prasad and Rajan, 2008; Claessens and Naude, 1993).
The analysis is done ﬁrst for the entire sample of countries and then for the
12two groups - high income and Low and middle income countries - separately.
The list of countries included in each group are presented in Table 3. Table 4
presents the summary statistics of each of the regressors for all countries and
by income group. Several of the variables have diﬀerent mean values by income
group. Table 5 presents the results of diﬀerence in means tests for some variables
of interest, by income group. For each variable of interest, Table 5 presents the
results of an OLS regression on the High Income dummy variable and a constant.
The estimated constants are then the mean values of the dependent variable for
Low and Middle Income group. High income countries have net interest margins
and overhead costs that are signiﬁcantly lower than low and middle income
countries. The return on equity is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the two
groups, and concentration in banking assets is actually signiﬁcantly larger for
high income countries than for low and middle income countries. This, combined
with the signiﬁcantly higher level of ﬁnancial development (non-bank ﬁnancial
sector) in the high income economies, suggests that concentration may not be
the best proxy for the level of competitiveness of the banking sector. This is
consistent with the results of Claessens and Laeven (2004) who create a measure
of bank competitiveness based on contestability of the market and ﬁnd that it
does not negatively relate to concentration. Moreover, the correlation between
net interest margins and de-jure controls is -0.45, indicating that countries with
greater openness are also one with lower net interest margins and underscoring
the validity of net interest margins as a proxy for lack of competitiveness in
banking rather than for bank eﬃciency.
2.1 Results on Bank Competition and International Fi-
nancial Integration
2.1.1 Full Sample
The results of the regressions are presented in Tables 6 to 8. Table 6 presents the
results for the entire sample. The coeﬃcient on net interest margins is negative
and signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, implying that less competitive banking systems
13are associated with lower price convergence with the rest of the world. The X-
standardized coeﬃcient on net interest margin is -0.0911. This value means that
a one standard deviation increase in net interest margin would lead to a fall in
the integration index of 0.09, or a 0.20 standard deviation fall. As an example,
if Argentina’s net interest margins fell from 0.061 in 2005 to the level of net
interest margins in Belgium in 2005, or 0.0149 (a 2.57 standard deviation fall)
other things being equal, its integration index would rise from -0.258 to -0.026,
roughly the level for Singapore in 2004.
When overhead costs as a proportion of bank assets is used as a proxy for
competitiveness, the result is again a negative coeﬃcient that is signiﬁcant at 10
percent level. The coeﬃcient on return on equity is not signiﬁcant but negative,
while that on concentration index is positive. Since previous studies have shown
that concentration is only weakly, if at all, related to banking sector compet-
itiveness, I looked for threshold eﬀects in ﬁnancial development variable. The
idea is that markets like Hong Kong, Singapore and UK, which have concentra-
tion ratios exceeding 0.95 for one or more years (it is 0.99 for Singapore in 2005)
may nevertheless have competitive banking systems that face competition from
the non-bank ﬁnancial sector. I therefore created a variable that is the product
of concentration and negative of the ﬁnancial development index, for values of
ﬁnancial development below the threshold, and zero otherwise. This variable
would take larger (positive) values for markets that have greater concentration
and lower ﬁnancial development, as long as ﬁnancial development is below the
threshold, and is zero otherwise. For values of ﬁnancial development between
-0.9 (roughly the 34th percentile) and -1.50 (the 17th percentile) the coeﬃcient
of the interaction term was negative and signiﬁcant 12. The interaction term
in Table 6, column (4) uses the threshold -0.9. This suggests that at low lev-
els of ﬁnancial development, the coeﬃcient of concentration variable is smaller,
11The X-standardized coeﬃcient is the beta multiplied by the standard deviation of the X-
variable.
12For thresholds lower than the 17th percentile, the coeﬃcient was still negative but not
signiﬁcant, which may be because the number of observations actually used in regressions for
which the threshold was not crossed was too low
14although it is still positive.
The coeﬃcient for de-jure openness is positive and signiﬁcant and roughly
the same size in all columns of Table 6. The X-standardized coeﬃcient for de-
jure openness is lower than the one for net interest margins (0.07), but larger
than that for overheads. These results indicate that although capital controls
do lead to lower price convergence, however, the relationship is far from one to
one. This is consistent with the widely held view that market players ﬁnd ways
around controls and with other studies on the eﬀectiveness of capital controls13.
Both exchange rate spreads and coeﬃcient of variation in exchange rates
enter with a negative sign, as expected and are signiﬁcant in all regressions in
the full country sample, indicating that liquidity and shocks play an important
role in determining price-convergence. There is a signiﬁcant positive trend in
openness, indicating that the recent wave of globalization has led to price con-
vergence. Currency crisis are associated with a signiﬁcant decline in openness,
other things being the same, but in the full sample, the same is not true for
banking crisis.
2.1.2 Results by Income Group
Table 7 presents the results using data on high income countries only. In this
country grouping, the only variables that enter signiﬁcantly are the level of le-
gal restrictions, a trend and the level of institutional development. All have a
positive sign, indicating that the fewer the restrictions on ﬂows and the better
the institutions, the higher the level of openness. Given the high level of de-
jure openness in these countries, it is not surprising that most of the banking
competitiveness variables are not signiﬁcant. As discussed in the introduction,
when there are no or few constraints on access to overseas ﬁnancial markets,
the level of banking competition becomes irrelevant. The positive and signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcient on return on equity may only reﬂect greater eﬃciency in these
markets. The R2 in the high-income country regressions are also quite low.
13See, for example, Garber 1998, Garcia 2006 and Aizenman 2004 for studies on evasion of
capital controls
15In contrast, the R2 for low and middle income country sample are very high,
around 0.7 for each speciﬁcation. The banking sector competitiveness indicators,
net interest margins, overheads and return on equity, all have negative coeﬃ-
cients that are larger in magnitude than for the full sample, and signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level. The concentration index is not signiﬁcant. Currency crisis
and greater volatility in the forex markets are both associated with signiﬁcantly
low levels of de-facto openness, whereas both institutional quality and ﬁnancial
development are associated with higher de-facto openness. De-jure restrictions
matter, but the coeﬃcients are smaller than for the high income country sample
and not always signiﬁcant. Trade and GDP enter with negative signs and are
both signiﬁcant but that may just reﬂect the fact that there were several crisis
episodes in the emerging markets with higher GDPs and trade-openness in the
sample under consideration and that we have a smaller time series for these
countries than for higher income countries.
3 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a price based measure of ﬁnancial openness for 54 countries
and for an average of 13 years per country. This index captures an important
aspect of international ﬁnancial integration - the degree to which interest rates
are aligned with international markets - that has so far been missing in the
studies of impact of ﬁnancial openness on growth, macroeconomic volatility as
well as contagion. While there is a clear trend of increasing openness in the
high income countries before the onset of current crisis, the same was not true
for the developing countries.
Further, this paper makes a contribution to the literature on determinants
of de-facto integration and looks at a previously ignored angle - the relation-
ship between banking sector competitiveness and de-facto integration. Although
none of the measures used are perfect, they all point to a strong link between
bank competitiveness and price convergence in international markets, especially
for low and middle income countries. This has several policy implications. The
16restrictions on international integration are not the sum total of controls on
cross border transactions - domestic regulations impinge on international inte-
gration. Liberalizing domestic ﬁnancial sectors may provide all the beneﬁts of
more eﬃcient domestic allocation of resources but in addition would provide
the beneﬁts from a greater international integration. Schaeck et. al. (2006)
ﬁnd that more competitive banking systems are more stable and Fecht et. al.
(2007) that greater international integration of interbank markets enchances re-
siliance to ideosyncratic shocks. The link between the two may be that more
competitive systems are also more integrated with the rest of the world.
The paper also ﬁnds that the determinants of price integration diﬀer between
developed and developing countries. Periods of volatility and currency crisis are
periods of low price-integration for developing countries. Moreover, for this
group, while the link between capital controls and price-convergence exists, it is
not strong, providing further proof that capital controls do get evaded. In both
the developed and developing country samples, greater ﬁnancial development is
associated with greater de-facto openness. Trade openness is not a signiﬁcant
determinant of de-facto integration in developed markets but is associated with
lower integration in the developing countries sample. This may be because
the study ignores threshold eﬀects. Increasing trade openness may increase
convergence but only when the level of de-jure controls are high and when
corruption is high. The impact of tightening of capital controls on de-facto
integration may also depend on the level of institutional development. These
thresholds eﬀects may be a subject of future research.
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22Table 1. Integration Index Availability
Market N Begin Year End Year
Argentina 5 2004 2008
Australia 23 1986 2008
Austria 20 1989 2008
Belgium 19 1990 2008
Brazil 6 2003 2008
Bulgaria 5 2004 2008
Canada 24 1985 2008
Chile 7 2002 2008
China 7 2002 2008
Colombia 5 2004 2008
Croatia 6 2003 2008
Czech Republic 12 1997 2008
Denmark 21 1988 2008
Estonia 10 1999 2008
Finland 17 1992 2008
France 20 1989 2008
Germany 18 1991 2008
Greece 12 1997 2008
Hong Kong 23 1986 2008
Hungary 11 1998 2008
Iceland 5 2004 2008
India 10 1999 2008
Indonesia 9 2000 2008
Ireland 20 1989 2008
Israel 8 2001 2008
Italy 18 1991 2008
Japan 13 1996 2008
Kazakhstan 5 2004 2008
Kuwait 7 2002 2008
Latvia 8 2001 2008
Lithuania 9 2000 2008
Malaysia 19 1990 2008
Mexico 12 1997 2008
Netherlands 20 1989 2008
New Zealand 23 1986 2008
Norway 23 1986 2008
Pakistan 5 2004 2008
Philippines 12 1997 2008
Poland 10 1999 2008
Portugal 16 1993 2008
Romania 5 2004 2008
23Table 1 (cont’d)
Market N Begin Year End Year
Russian Federation 5 2004 2008
Saudi Arabia 7 2002 2008
Singapore 23 1986 2008
Slovakia 7 2002 2008
Slovenia 5 2004 2008
South Africa 12 1997 2008
Spain 20 1989 2008
Sweden 22 1987 2008
Switzerland 25 1984 2008
Thailand 13 1996 2008
Turkey 10 1999 2008
United Arab Emirates 2 2007 2008
United Kingdom 25 1984 2008
Total 704 1984 2008
24Table 2. International Integration Index: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Dev Max Min CV
All Countries 704 0.00 0.48 0.54 -4.88 ..
High Income Countries 519 0.06 0.33 0.54 -2.20 5.32
Low and Middle Income Countries 185 -0.18 0.73 0.50 -4.88 -4.11
Table 3. Countries by Income Group
High Income Countries
High Income, OECD: Iceland Switzerland
Australia Ireland United Kingdom
Austria Netherlands High Income, Non OECD:
Belgium Italy Estonia
Canada Japan Hong Kong
Czech Republic Netherlands Israel
Denmark New Zealand Kuwait
Finland Norway Saudi Arabia
France Portugal Singapore
Germany Slovakia Slovenia
Greece Spain United Arab Emirates
Hungary Sweden
Low and Middle Income Countries





Croatia Russian Federation Philippines
Kazakhstan South Africa Thailand
Latvia Turkey Low Income
Lithuania Pakistan
25Table 4. Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Dev Max Min CV
KA Open 637 1.68 1.18 2.53 -1.13 0.70
CV IB 704 0.12 0.11 0.99 0.00 0.88
CV XF 704 0.04 0.03 0.43 0.00 0.73
X Spread 648 0.06 0.09 0.66 0.00 1.42
Institutions 702 0.00 1.30 2.34 -4.05 ..
Trade 574 0.92 0.65 4.74 0.19 0.70
GDPpc2000USD 595 16.55 10.22 41.45 0.44 0.62
Overheads 593 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.55
Net Interest Margins 593 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.60
Concentration 597 0.68 0.19 1.00 0.16 0.27
ROE 586 0.09 0.14 1.03 -1.44 1.59
Financial Development 529 0.00 1.61 6.86 -2.19
High Income Countries
KA Open 474 2.14 0.69 2.53 -1.13 0.32
CV IB 519 0.12 0.11 0.99 0.00 0.94
CV XF 519 0.04 0.02 0.22 0.00 0.56
X Spread 490 0.05 0.07 0.66 0.00 1.38
Institutions 517 0.56 0.93 2.34 -2.26 1.67
Trade 433 0.93 0.69 4.74 0.19 0.74
GDPpc2000USD 454 20.71 7.92 41.45 3.79 0.38
Overheads 433 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.52
Net Interest Margins 433 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.39
Concentration 437 0.72 0.18 1.00 0.30 0.25
ROE 426 0.09 0.10 1.03 -0.50 1.15
Financial Development 397 0.24 1.56 6.86 -1.89 6.59
Low and Middle Income Countries
KA Open 163 0.33 1.26 2.53 -1.13 3.82
CV IB 185 0.13 0.09 0.46 0.00 0.71
CV XF 185 0.04 0.04 0.43 0.00 0.99
X Spread 158 0.09 0.12 0.66 0.00 1.29
Institutions 185 -1.56 0.84 0.50 -4.05 -0.54
Trade 141 0.89 0.49 0.23 0.25 0.55
GDPpc2000USD 141 3.16 1.79 8.69 0.44 0.57
26Table 4 (cont’d)
N Mean Std Dev Max Min CV
Overheads 160 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.52
Net Interest Margins 160 0.05 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.56
Concentration 160 0.57 0.17 1.00 0.16 0.30
ROE 160 0.08 0.21 1.01 -1.44 2.46
Financial Development 132 -0.71 1.55 4.23 -2.19 -2.17
Note. — GDP per capita is in thousands of 2000 US dollars.
27Table 5. Diﬀerence in Means Tests
Net Int Margin Overhead ROE Concentration FinclDevpt Instn KA Open
High Income -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.14*** 0.95*** 2.11*** 1.81***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08)
Constant 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.57*** -0.71*** -1.56*** 0.33***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 593 593 586 597 529 702 637
R2 0.269 0.080 0.000 0.118 0.065 0.515 0.451
Note. — Net Int Margin refers to Net Interest Margins, FinclDEvpt is the Financial Development Index, Instn
refers to Institutional index. The table shows the output of OLS regression of the variable in the column header
on the dummy variable High Income and a constant. The estimated constant term is the mean of the dependent
variable for Low and Middle income countries. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
2
8Table 6. Explaining De-facto Integration
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4
KA Open 0.06* 0.07** 0.06** 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CV IB -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.09
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
CV X -4.36*** -5.37*** -5.48*** -5.44***
(1.13) (1.15) (1.11) (1.13)
X Spread -0.69** -0.78** -0.78** -0.84**
(0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
Bank Crisis -0.10 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Currency Crisis -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.25***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Trend 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Institution 0.05 0.06** 0.05* 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Financial Development 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Trade -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11** -0.10**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
GDPpc2000USD -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)








Concentration* Low FinclDevpt -0.10*
(0.06)
Constant -0.02 -0.14 -0.17 -0.32*
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Observations 448 448 439 450
R2 0.326 0.316 0.315 0.330
Number of coden 51 51 51 51
Note. — Regressions use Prais-Winston 2SLS proceedure with panel speciﬁc
AR(1) error processes. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05,
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
29Table 7. Explaining De-facto Integration: High Income Countries
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4
KA Open 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.14***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
CV IB 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
CV X 0.52 0.58 0.99 0.43
(0.97) (0.96) (1.06) (0.97)
X spread 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03
(0.44) (0.43) (0.41) (0.42)
Bank Crisis -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Currency Crisis -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Trend 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Institutions 0.07* 0.07* 0.06* 0.06*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Financial Development 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Trade -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GDPpc2000USD -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)








Constant -0.70*** -0.68*** -0.76*** -0.79***
(0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
Observations 343 343 334 345
R2 0.165 0.168 0.170 0.165
Number of coden 30 30 30 30
Note. — Regressions use Prais-Winston 2SLS proceedure with panel
speciﬁc AR(1) error processes. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1,
∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
30Table 8. Explaining De-facto Integration: Low and Middle Income Countries
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4
Ka Open 0.09** 0.07 0.10*** 0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
CV IB -0.74 -0.56 -0.94** -0.65
(0.47) (0.44) (0.43) (0.45)
CV X -1.26 -3.59** -3.44** -4.14**
(1.64) (1.68) (1.48) (1.70)
X spread -0.36 -0.36 -0.30 -0.48
(0.39) (0.40) (0.36) (0.41)
Bank Crisis -0.10 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Currency Crisis -1.77*** -1.77*** -1.86*** -1.66***
(0.51) (0.54) (0.56) (0.59)
Trend 0.04* 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Institutions 0.10* 0.12** 0.07 0.12**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Financial Development 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Trade -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.35*** -0.38***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
GDPpc2000USD -0.04** -0.04* -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)








Constant 0.56 0.52 0.52 0.31
(0.47) (0.55) (0.47) (0.54)
Observations 105 105 105 105
R2 0.701 0.678 0.678 0.674
Number of coden 21 21 21 21
Note. — Regressions use Prais-Winston 2SLS proceedure with panel
speciﬁc AR(1) error processes. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1,
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Figure 2 . Integration Index, by Income Group.
Excluding Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey.
32Appendix: Data Sources
Variable Name Description & Source
Bank Crisis Dummy Variable, 1 if the year is a banking crisis year.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Concentration Share of the three largest banks’ assets in total assets of the bank-
ing sector in the country.
Source: Beck et. al. (2000)
Currency Crisis Dummy Variable, 1 if the year has a crisis month. Crisis month
identiﬁed as months where an index of currency market pres-
sure (deﬁned as a weighted average of exchange rate and reserve
changes) exceeds the mean by 3 or more standard deviations, as
in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Data on exchange rates, in-
ﬂation rates and reserve assets from IMF International Financial
Statistics database.
CV IB Average of the within-year coeﬃcient of variation in 1 and 3 month
interbank interest rates.
Source: Bloomberg, Global Financial Database and Datastream
CV X Average of the within-year coeﬃcient of variation in 1 and 3 month
forward exchange rates.
Source: Bloomberg and Datastream
Financial Development Financial Development index, constructed as ﬁrst principal com-
ponent of stock market capitalization, life insurance premium,
stock market value traded, and domestic credit to private sector
as % of GDP. Higher values indicate greater development. Data
for the components was sourced from Beck et. al. (2000) for the
ﬁrst three and World Bank’s World Development Indicators for
domestic credit to private sector.
GDPpc2000USD Per capita GDP in thousands of 2000 USD.
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
33Data Sources, Contd.
Variable Name Description & Source
Index Integration index constructed using TAR models on CIP diﬀeren-
tials. The index is centered at 0 and higher values indicate greater
openness. The US is assumed to be the home country in the con-
struction of CIP deviations. Diﬀerentials are based on onshore
forward rates, except for Chile, where NDF rates were used. The
daily data on onshore forward rates, spot rates and interbank in-
terest rates on 1 and 3 month maturity loans are from Bloomberg,
Datastream and Global Financial Database. Closing prices used
in all calculations.
Institutions Institutional variable, ﬁrst principal component of ICRG Corrup-
tion and Political Risk variables.
Source: PRG International Country Risk Guide.
KA Open Chinn Ito (2007) measure of de-jure openness, higher values indi-
cate greater legal restrictions on ﬂows of capital.
Net Interest Margin. Net Interest Margins in Banking. This variable equals the ac-
counting value of banks’ net interest revenue as a share of its
total assets.
Source: Beck et.al (2000)
Overheads Accounting value of a country’s banks’ overhead costs as a share
of their total assets.
Source: Beck et. al. (2000)
ROE Banks’ return on equity.
Source: Beck et.al. (2000)
Trade Trade as % of GDP.
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators database
X Spread Yearly average of daily closing bid-ask spread on the spot exchange
rate, as a percentage of the mean rate.
Source: Thomson Financial’s Datastream
34